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INTRODUCTION
HE extremely rare type of high-level, sustained postwar economic growth
experienced by the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea) and Taiwan has
drawn the attention of many scholars interested in economic development.
Many have also attempted to analyze the two economies as examples of identical
economic phenomena. Since both economies’ development pattern can be charac-
terized by export-led industrialization depending on the Japanese and U.S. mar-
kets, such views are not at all surprising. However, having a common development
pattern does not necessarily guarantee the existence of a common mechanism by
which development was achieved. In fact, there is a heated debate in progress con-
cerning the way in which Korea and Taiwan achieved development between those
who support a market-led development hypothesis and those who support a gov-
ernment-led development hypothesis.
In the present paper, we aim to rid ourselves of such a debate by suggesting that
there were different mechanisms by which the two economies developed and dis-
cussing the reasons why these mechanisms are different. In Section I, we will de-
fine what we mean by “development pattern” and “development mechanism.” In
Section II we will verify the similarity of Korea and Taiwan with respect to high-
level economic growth and their development patterns. Then in Section III, we will
review the research to date concerning development mechanism, show that both
the market-led and government-led development hypotheses have been built upon
strong a priori assumptions, and argue that the similarities and differences between
development mechanisms in the two economies should be reexamined after re-
moving such assumptions from consideration. This is one important aim of this
paper. In Section IV, we will attempt to show through a comparison of trade bal-
ances, growth of total factor productivity (TFP), enterprise and business-group
scale, and the development processes of individual industries in the two economies
that it is impossible to imagine that Korea and Taiwan developed by the same
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1 Lewis (1984, p. 4) has classified the problem of development into “pattern” and “mechanism”
(even though he used the term “engine of growth” instead of “mechanism”). However, the discus-
sion in this paper does not necessarily agree with the content of Lewis’s research.
2 These two types of industrialization pattern are not related to government policy directions, but are
rather classifications based on high or low levels of reliance by manufacturers on overseas markets
measured in actual economic performance figures.
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mechanism. Okuda’s paper in this special issue shows us the difference in TFP
growth between two economies. In our investigation of enterprise scale, we will
rely on the results of the research done by Abe and Kawakami, and with respect to
our industrial analysis, we will rely on Sat $o’s research on the machine-tool and
electronics industries and Abe and Kawakami’s research on synthetic fiber indus-
try. Studies of enterprise scale and the electronics industry are also contained in
this issue. Section V lays out the other important aim of this paper: to discuss the
reasons why the development mechanisms in the two economies differ, by offering
three explanatory hypotheses based on accumulation at the starting point of post-
war industrialization, the relationship between government and society, and the
mechanism of social network formation. We will rely on the paper written for this
special issue by Wakabayashi concerning the relationship between government
and society and on the papers written by Hattori and Numazaki on social network
formation. A concluding section will outline the implications of our study.
I. DEVELOPMENT PATTERN AND DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM
We will consider the reasons for high-level economic growth in Korea and Taiwan
as multifaceted like Figure 1. Here we would like to define two elements of such a
logical structure: “pattern” and “mechanism.”1
To begin with, there are theoretically several number of paths economies can
take in order to achieve economic development. The first step involves a choice
between industrialization and agricultural development: the industrialization pat-
tern may be of a domestic market-led or export-led type.2 In addition, there is also
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a choice between whether final, intermediate, and capital-goods markets will be
developed together or in some sort of time succession. These kinds of path we will
call “development patterns.”
If there is no one to decide which of the above paths to take and no one lead the
economy along the path, no economic development can be realized. In the present
paper, we will compare differences and similarities in “development mechanism”
by comparing who chose a certain path to development and on the basis of what
kind of principles such a choice was made. Therefore, we consider the market-led
development hypothesis and the government-led development hypothesis as points
of debate over “development mechanism.” Under a market-led development
mechanism, households and private enterprises make economic decisions based on
the principles of market-based competition; while under a government-led devel-
opment mechanism, political leaders make the choice of which path they will take
and attempt to directly and indirectly mobilize resources to the cause of develop-
ment and growth.
As we will argue in Section V, the kind of “development mechanism” that will
result is determined by various factors, in particular political and social factors.
The ways in which such determinative factors are regarded are a “development
mechanisms” in the broader sense, while the way in which a certain “development
pattern” is chosen is “a development mechanism” in the narrow sense.
II. SIMILARITIES IN DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS: EXPORT-LED
INDUSTRIALIZATION RELYING ON U.S. AND
JAPANESE MARKETS
In this section, we will discuss the fact that the high levels of economic growth
recorded by Korea and Taiwan were achieved through extremely similar develop-
ment patterns. Yearly growth rates in the two economies’ respective per capita
GNPs between 1965 and 1990 averaged 7.1 per cent (Table I). Only the country of
Botswana performed better (World Bank 1992; ROC 1994). Also the fact that such
high economic growth rates were accompanied by improvements in income distri-
bution was one more characteristic feature of economic development in both
economies (World Bank 1993, pp. 29–32).
As to the actual pattern, first, it is clear that high-level economic growth was
achieved through industrialization; that is, the growth of the manufacturing sector.
The importance of  manufacturing sectors in the GDP of both economies since the
1960s has increased by more than 10 per cent and reached peaks of 33 per cent in
1988 (Korea) and 40 per cent in 1986 (Taiwan). Both the speed and the high levels
characterizing these two growth processes are indeed rare cases in the history of
developing economies. Moreover, the structural features of the manufacturing sec-
tors in the both economies are similar. That is to say, labor-intensive industries,
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TABLE I
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN KOREA AND TAIWAN
Korea Taiwan
Per capital GNP (U.S.$) 1961 83 152
1990  5,659 7,954
Average growth rate of 1960–90 7.1 7.1
per capita GNP (%)
Manufacturing output / GDP (%) 1961  9.1 18.9
Peak 33.2 (1988)   39.7 (1986)
1990  28.9 34.4
Exports / GDP (%) 1961  5.4 14.0
Peak 41.5 (1987) 56.7 (1986)
1990 31.0 46.5
Imports / GDP (%) 1961  14.9 21.1
Peak 41.5 (1981) 53.8 (1980)
1990  31.5 41.2
U.S. share of exports (%) Peak in 40.0 (1986) 48.8 (1984)
the 1980s
Japan share of imports (%) Peak in 34.4 (1986) 34.1 (1986)
the 1980s
Sources: Figures for Korea are from the Republic of Korea, National Statistical Office, Ma-
jor Statistics of Korean Economy, various years; for Taiwan from the Republic of China,
Council for Economic Planning and Development, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, various
years.
Note: Taiwan’s dependence on trade in terms of GNP.
represented by textiles, developed during the early stages, while from the 1970s on
both capital-intensive and technology-intensive industries evolved.
Secondly, reliance on foreign trade rapidly grew in importance. While small
economies like Korea and Taiwan are inclined to depend more on trade, exception-
ally high-peak reliance levels of 42 per cent (Korea) and 54 per cent (Taiwan) were
reached as to export share in 1980s. This phenomenon is very different from the
situation in the newly industrializing countries of Latin America.
Finally, Korea and Taiwan possessed similar trading partners. On the export
side, they both sold their manufactured goods mainly to the United States, the
world’s largest market, while on the import side, Japan was their main source of
supply. At the peak years during the 1980s, both economies relied on the United
States to consume 40 per cent or more of their exports, while over 30 per cent of the
goods and services imported into the two economies came from Japan.
Summing up the above three characteristics of development in Korea and Tai-
wan, it is clear that both economies can be similarly described as developing
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through “export-led industrialization with heavy reliance on the United States and
Japan.” In other words, both economies achieved high-level growth by first import-
ing intermediate and capital goods from Japan, processing them by utilizing rich
sources of inexpensive labor, then exporting the finished goods to consumers in the
United States. Also, because this process of industrialization involved mainly la-
bor-intensive industries, the capability to absorb huge amounts of unskilled labor
into the production process resulted in improvements in income distribution. Al-
though both industrial structures would head from the 1970s in the direction of
capital- and technology-intensive patterns, their reliance on importing much of the
needed capital and intermediate goods, especially from Japan, remained as strong
as before, and the markets for the goods produced remained overseas, predomi-
nately in the United States, also as before.
III. DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM HYPOTHESES
None of the research to date has raised any argument about the  above-mentioned
facts concerning development patterns in Korea and Taiwan. However, as to how
these patterns appeared—referred to as the “development mechanism” in the
present paper—heated debate continues in the literature over two opposing
conceptualizations: a market-led development hypothesis and a government-led
development hypothesis. Let us first put the points of this debate into some order.
A. The Market-Led Development Hypothesis
According to this hypothesis, the governments of both Korea and Taiwan were
restrained from intervening in their respective economies, resulting in a smoothly
functioning market mechanism helping to achieve high-level economic growth.
This hypothesis is supported by economists affiliated with the World Bank and the
IMF, such as Bela Balassa and Anne O. Krueger.
Concerning restricted government intervention, since the publication of Balassa
(1971), a “transition” from import-substitution policies to export-oriented policies
in both states has been emphasized. It is thought that both states implemented im-
port-substitution measures together with other developing economies beginning in
the early 1950s; then Taiwan from the end of that decade and Korea from the early
1960s instituted various export-promotion policies, such as devaluating their for-
eign exchange rates, relaxing some quantitative restrictions, and reducing tariffs.
According to the market-led development hypothesis, this policy transition is inter-
preted as the liberalization of the two economies needed to realize the high levels of
growth that followed.3
3 In fact, the deregulation of imports was carried out on a very limited basis. For this reason, any bias
toward import-substitution must be offset by such export-oriented measures as rebate systems,
bond systems, and export loan programs.
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Empirical work done by Balassa (1978) includes periodical analysis of export
incentives carried out in eleven different countries, including Korea and Taiwan.
Balassa showed that the best performances have been achieved by Korea, Taiwan,
and Singapore, all of which have continuously implemented export-oriented mea-
sures. In a joint research project with economists from several countries (Balassa
1982), he compared effective protection rates and found them to be at their lowest
in Korea and Taiwan.
In response to criticism from supporters of the government-led development
hypothesis, the World Bank revised its position somewhat by introducing such
concepts into the market-led development hypothesis as contest-based competition
and financial restraint (World Bank 1993); however, in its continuing denial of any
sector-specific intervention by government (p. 312), it has not changed its original
position that Korean or Taiwanese governments have not guided their respective
economies toward prosperity.
B. The Government-Led Development Hypothesis
In directly opposing the market-led development hypothesis, this conceptuali-
zation of development mechanism regards the economic development realized in
Korea and Taiwan as the result of active intervention by their governments in eco-
nomic affairs. Alice H. Amsden and Robert Wade are typical supporters of this
hypothesis, who offer a rich body of factual information in support of government
intervention being conducted even after the 1960s, a time when, according to the
market-led development hypothesis, economic liberalization was being imple-
mented.
Amsden (1989, p. 80) has attempted to show that choices in Korea concerning
where capital will be invested are not made by private business, but by the govern-
ment. In support of her claims, she cites the passage of the Electronics Industry
Promotion Law, which played an active role in the R&D planning, fund procure-
ment, and the establishment of a research institute for semiconductor-related devel-
opment (Amsden 1989, pp. 82–83). She also analyzes the development of the ship-
building and steel industries, concluding that the government played an important
role there as well (Amsden 1989, chs. 11, 12).
Wade has depicted government intervention in Taiwan from two different ap-
proaches. The first analyzes specific industries (Wade 1990, ch. 4), emphasizing
the petrochemical and steel industries, which were set up in the form of public
enterprises. The other approach involves the analysis of policy measures (Wade
1990, chs. 5, 6), in which he shows that (1) the effects of tariffs in distorting
Taiwan’s price mechanism were not small; (2) the government imposed various
conditions on allowing foreign direct investment; and (3) an important role was
played by public-enterprise-dominated industry building and tax holidays.
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C. Getting beyond the Debate
The research done by Amsden and Wade telling of widespread government in-
tervention of both the economies of Korea and Taiwan is difficult to refute. In
particular, the discovery of intervention policy directed toward specific industries
has cast doubt upon the market-led development mechanism hypothesis. At the
present time, the focus of the debate has been shifted to the problem of whether or
not such industry-specific policy was really effective. Nevertheless, from the em-
pirical research that has been done to date, there is no easy way to disprove one side
or the other. We therefore see no apparent end to the market-led vs. government-
led development debate. The market-led development side in the debate has set
upon the task of denying the effectiveness of government intervention through
quantitative analysis, but has not met with much success.
For example, the World Bank (1993, ch. 6) has utilized estimates of TFP in order
to refute the effectiveness of discriminatory industrial policy. However, if we take
into consideration such factors as the linkage effects of industrial policy and the
time lag that exists between implementation and result, there is room for doubt as
to whether TFP is a suitable indicator of policy effectiveness.4
In addition, the study by Stern et al. (1995) contains an extremely detailed analy-
sis of heavy industrialization in Korea during the 1970s, and in Chapter 5 there is a
scrupulous cost-benefit analysis of individual projects. On the whole, the authors of
this study are skeptical about the effects of intervention by the Korean government;
however, looking at their analytical results in a more impartial manner, although
there is no evidence to praise the effects of industrial policy, there is also no evi-
dence for condemning such policy.5
Before we state our view concerning the problem, we must free ourselves from
the influence of both hypotheses. Although these two hypothesis put their support-
ers on opposite ends of the question over whether government intervention in in-
dustry is present or necessary, they display a strange match-up by lumping together
Korea and Taiwan economies. Treating the two economies in this manner results
4 This doubt has been raised by both Masayoshi Shiratori and Wade. See World Bank and OECF
([1993], pp. 37, 39).
5 They set up two measurement standards (Stern et al. 1995, pp. 189–90). The first is a “market
conforming test,” which considers a project targeted by industrial policy successful if the rate of
return surpasses the cost of capital in both base-year and current prices. The second is a “non-
market conforming test,” which considers a project successful if the rate of return does not surpass
the cost of capital in base-year prices but eventually surpasses in current prices.
None of the projects studied conformed to the second standard, while half of the tests for the first
standard failed, while the test for the second standard was probably too rigorous to judge the true
effects of industrial policy. Furthermore, they mention that even if a project were to meet the first
standard, there still may not be any reason to support the necessity of industrial policy. In any case,
they do not present adequate proof for condemning such policy, and their methodology cannot take
into account the linkage effects of industrial policy.
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from very strong a priori assumptions in each hypothesis. Specifically, the market-
led development hypothesis assumes, as Y$onosuke Hara (1994) has claimed, “an
imperfect state characterized by widespread corruption and a perfect market that
will function efficiently only if the stupid coercive policies of that government are
removed” (p. 42). On the other hand, the government-led development hypothesis
assumes “a state whose administrative capability is manned by autonomous bu-
reaucrats not involved with the country’s vested interest groups and an imperfect
market that is in apparent danger of not functioned properly due to the presence of
economies of scale and complementarity among firms” (p. 43). The main problems
with these assumptions are the “perfect market” in the former and “the strong and
wise state” in the latter, for which there is no evidence.6 Rather, we need to begin
studying the extent to which markets worked well and the level to which the state
appeared strong and wise in its judgments.
By freeing ourselves from the untenable assumptions behind the market- and
government-led development hypotheses, we also free Korean and Taiwanese
economies from lump-sum analysis. This is where the first important point to be
made in this paper—are the development mechanisms in the two economies iden-
tical?—comes into focus.7
IV. DEVELOPMENT MECHANISMS IN KOREA AND TAIWAN
With respect to the development mechanism in Korea and Taiwan, we look upon
that of the former as more government-led in character, and that of the latter as
more market-led. This hypothesis is supported by the following facts.
First, the balance of payments and the investment-savings gap in the two econo-
mies are completely different. With the exception of a few years during the late
1980s, Korea experienced deficits in its balance of payments as investment ex-
ceeded savings. Especially during the 1970s, the trade deficit continued to widen
appreciably. On the other hand, with the exception of the oil-crisis years at the
beginning of the 1970s, Taiwan continued after 1971 to experience trade surpluses,
as savings exceeded investment. As far as the 1970s is concerned, the reasons for
such differences are that Taiwan was able to cover investment utilizing a high rate
of saving, while the Korean government, despite a lower rate of saving, ambi-
tiously promoted investment by introducing money from abroad.
6 For example, Wade (1990, p. 256) states that economic administrators in Taiwan have been sepa-
rated from the political process; but this is hardly sufficient proof that the Taiwanese government is
strong and of wise judgment.
7 As mentioned in the following section, although there is plentiful research comparing Korea and
Taiwan economies, not one study has been done in the context of juxtaposing the market-led and
government-led development hypotheses. In addition, although the research done from each stand-
point does not ignore the differences existing between the two economies, due to the above-men-
tioned stringent assumptions, such differences always seem to appear as secondary.
349INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS
Secondly, the pattern of TFP growth in the two economies is different, according
to Okuda’s paper in this issue.  First, the contribution of TFP to growth is larger in
Taiwan than in Korea. This fact is compatible with our hypothesis because the
efforts by Korean government concentrating on mobilization and introduction of
money from abroad, which was the most scarce resource, while the Taiwanese
private sector contrived to improve productivity without aggressive governmental
support. Secondly, Okuda reveals that the export ratio had a negative effect on TFP
growth in Korea, which is considered to be caused by policies which requesting
enterprises to export, even when such activity was not profitable, in exchange for
favored status in protected domestic market.
Thirdly, individual enterprises and business groups in Korea and Taiwan differ
with respect to size.8 The Korean government took the lead in guiding the economy
toward industrialization; but it did not attempt to conduct managerial operations
per se in each industry. Instead, a small number of business groups worked as
agents implementing the government’s plan in exchange for favored treatment in
such areas as subsidized loans (Scitovsky 1990, p. 144; Vogel 1991, p. 61). These
groups have developed into huge conglomerates called chaebol. On the other hand,
the Taiwanese government adopted few special measures geared to specific sec-
tors, and, moreover, since it took no special measures to allot investments funds in
favor of any business groups (Scitovsky 1990, pp. 137–38).9 Therefore, Taiwanese
business groups did not grow to the mammoth size of their counterparts in Korea.
However, within export sector, which is characterized by relatively free competi-
tion, from the 1970s on small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) took the lead
and in so doing became the main support of Taiwan’s industrialization.10 We think
that such differences in enterprise size in the two economies also reflects the differ-
ences in their respective development mechanisms.
A detailed study comparing enterprise size in Korea and Taiwan has been con-
tributed to this special issue by Abe and Kawakami. Let us merely summarize their
conclusions here.
To begin with, a comparison of industrial census data from Korea and Taiwan
shows that during the 1980s the ratio of output of enterprises with 500 or more
employees to total manufacturing production output was 10 points higher in Korea.
Secondly, the importance of top business groups in the two economies was far
8 The research that first took special notice of such differences in enterprise size was done by Twu
(1987), Scitovsky (1990) and Vogel (1991).
9 Fields (1995) has argued that the governments in both states  can be called “strong,” but the Tai-
wanese government differed in the conscious efforts it made to restrict the size of Taiwanese busi-
ness groups. As to the reasons for such attempts, Fields cites Kuomintang ideology and it fears as
a “mainlander” government that the power of indigenous Taiwanese capital would be enhanced.
10 To the question of why SMEs, one answer is that these businesses and the networks they form are
superior due to their flexible and efficient response to fluctuations in overseas markets (Shieh
1992). For a more detailed explanation, see Sato (1996b, pp. 101–13).
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greater in Korea than in Taiwan. Thirdly, the authors looked at the role played by
SMEs in the export sectors of both economies and found that the ratio of SME
exports to total exports in Taiwan was greater, and that the export ratio in their sales
figures was greater than that of their counterparts in Korea.
The first two findings clearly coincide with the situation we have described con-
cerning the relationship between industrial policy and business groups in the two
economies; however, the third point deserves some additional explanation. The
cause of Taiwanese SMEs’ dominant role in the export sector has already been
explained, but we should ask why the presence of SMEs in exporting in Korea is so
small, or rather why large enterprises or chaebol have assumed the central role in
this sector. The reason again must be attributed to the way in which the government
has chosen to direct economic development in Korea. The Korean government has
given top priority to exports in its industrial policy and has allotted favors, such as
subsidized loans, to those who have performed well in this sector (Taniura 1989,
p. 127; Amsden 1989, pp. 16, 69–70).11 Therefore, in order to gain access to such
loans chaebol strove to improve their export performances by any means possible,
including exporting below cost. It is also possible to conclude that the way in which
business groups were transformed into chaebol was by successfully expanding
their export businesses, then gaining access to subsidized loans, which enabled
them to grow in size. In particular, we should note that despite such complete dif-
ferences in the development mechanism of the two economies, both economic de-
velopment patterns are characterized by the same export-led type.
The fourth set of facts in empirical support of our hypothesis comes from the
analysis of the development process of individual industries in the two economies,
which again demonstrates differences in development mechanism. Here we ana-
lyzed three industries: synthetic fiber, machine tools, and electronics (Abe and
Kawakami 1996, Sat$o 1996a, Sat $o’s paper in this special issue).12 These industries
in both economies are similar in that all six have expanded production rapidly over
the decades; however, they possess different characteristics with respect to such
aspects as industrial organization and market structure, the results of differences in
their development mechanisms.
Looking at the synthetic fiber industry up through the 1980s, the first difference
is an oligarchic industrial organization in Korea versus fierce competition in Tai-
wan. Secondly, in Korea most synthetic fiber was exported after domestic process-
ing, thus seldom exported as a raw material. In Taiwan the export rate of raw fiber
11 The World Bank (1993, pp. 93–102) has called this policy “a contest.” In other words, in Korea the
government acts as “referee” in a game played by “rules” based on export performance, and such
“prizes” as access to subsidized loans go the winners.
12 The pioneers in the comparison of individual industries in the two economies are Levy (1991) for
shoemaking, Jacobsson (1984) for machine tools, Mody (1990) and Levy and Kuo (1991) for
electronics.
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was high. These differences were due to the Korean government making adjust-
ments in fiber production according to the capacity of the midstream, including the
spinning and weaving sector, which processed the fiber and imposing restrictions
on industry entry, in an attempt to increase per company production scale. In Tai-
wan the government’s control over the industry was weak, allowing virtual free
industry entry and increases in capacity, resulting in periodic overproduction
which the mid- and lower streams were incapable of handling and were immedi-
ately exported. However, under such conditions, companies began to adopt strate-
gies taking exporting into account.
In the Korean machine-tool industry, the export rate was low and in-house pro-
cessing the rule. In Taiwan, the export rate was high, and a lot of subcontracting
was done. In Korea during the 1970s, the government fostered the machine-tool
industry as an import-substitution industry, protecting the domestic market and
urging users to buy Korean. The government also demanded that makers in the
industry up grade their products as quickly as possible, a situation to which the
existing supporting industry could not respond, resulting in the high proportion of
in-house production. In Taiwan up through the 1970s, the machine-tool industry
received almost no assistance from the government, and since 1980 the govern-
ment has played only a minor role. However, the industry’s makers began to sell
their products to Southeast Asian markets during the 1960s and the low-end U.S.
market during the 1970s through their own initiative. While the quality of these
goods was low, their cheap price made entry into these markets possible. American
sales of Taiwanese machine tools brought about a sudden jump in production scale,
causing increased specialization, which in turn helped the industry to further de-
velop.
With respect to the electronics industry, while Korea holds an advantage in inte-
grated circuits, matching the United States and Japan in DRAM production in par-
ticular, Taiwan is the world’s leading personal computer (PC) manufacturer. In
Korea the huge chaebol formed by the government’s industrial policy used its
financial power to begin DRAM production. On the other hand, in Taiwan during
the 1970s a network of SMEs began producing such electronics items as calcula-
tors and telephones, then expanded into PC production (Kawakami 1996). The
flexibility and quick responses of this SME network is perfectly suited to the short
commodity cycle of PC manufacturing.
In sum, the trade balances, TFP growth, sizes of enterprises and business groups,
and the development process of the three industries are all clearly different in Ko-
rea and Taiwan and support our hypothesis that Korean development mechanism
has been mostly government-led, while the development mechanism in Taiwan has
been mainly guided by the auspices of the market.
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V. THE REASONS FOR THE DIFFERENCES
Assuming that we have proved the development mechanisms in Korea and Taiwan
to be different, let us look at why. We have come up with three explanatory hypoth-
eses.
First, we should focus on different levels of capital accumulation at the starting
points of postwar economic development, or industrialization, in the two states. In
Korea hopes were very high for accelerated development, but the economy itself
was still at a very low level. We think that this situation forced policymakers and
the people to believe that development should be carried out through a strong gov-
ernment-led mechanism.
The fact that Korean level of economic development was lower than that of Tai-
wan is evident in the figures on per capita GNP. In 1961, per capita GNP in Korea
was only 55 per cent of the figure recorded by Taiwan. The savings rate in Korea
would continue to fall below the Taiwanese rate which was supposedly caused
mainly by the lower levels of productivity. Furthermore, Taiwan was already pro-
ducing sugar as a powerful agricultural export, enabling a certain level of foreign
currency acquisition. Korea fell behind in this aspect.
Industrialization in Korea also lagged behind. Looking back on the period dur-
ing which both countries were colonies of Japan, industrialization was progressing
during the 1930s and the Korean Peninsula was developing ahead of Taiwan. How-
ever, most of the factories were located in the north, and with the division of the
peninsula after World War II, Korea was cut off from the major industrial regions.
Also, most of the manufacturing enterprises including SMEs in prewar Korea was
owned and managed by Japanese. On the other hand, although many large corpora-
tions were also owned and managed by Japanese, the SMEs were owned and man-
aged by Taiwanese (Kimura 1988; Yamamoto 1992). Therefore, after the war Ko-
rea experienced setbacks both in terms of manufacturing facilities and human re-
sources, even before the destruction inflicted on the economy by the Korean War.
As a result, the resources, especially capital, necessary for economic develop-
ment was seriously lacking in Korea. It is our opinion that in order to utilize effec-
tively the scarce resources that were available, it was hoped that the government
would step in and ration them in a centralized manner. For this purpose the Park
Chung-hee administration nationalized the country’s financial institutions and took
control of loans from overseas. On the other hand, Taiwan’s economic level was
relatively higher, and although there too capital was scarce, the situation was by no
means as critical as in Korea, allowing Taiwan to take a more relaxed approach to
economic development.
Secondly, let us consider differences between Korea and Taiwan in the relation-
ships that exist between government and the private sector, or state and society in
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general. The case of Taiwan is probably easier to understand. The “quasi-conquer-
ing state” formed by the Kuomintang on the island after the civil war has a very
strong character (Wakabayashi’s paper) and has created a deep rift with the local
Taiwanese community. In particular, during the regime of Chiang Kai-shek, the
government took a detached attitude toward society and lacked concern about the
economic development of the island. In response, the people have nothing but dis-
trust and contempt for the government, making it impossible for the latter to mobi-
lize society’s various resources. It was this relationship between the government
and society that forms the background of the poor response by the private sector13
to the government’s call for investment to fund heavy industrialization in the
1970s.14
On the other hand, although Korea has been the scene of regional conflicts, the
situation, especially prior to the Kwangju Incident, was nowhere near as tense as in
Taiwan. Rather, the thinking and goals concerning economic development held by
most people in Korean society are the same as those held by the government, thus
creating ideal conditions for a government-led development mechanism. That is to
say, given the universal goal in Korea of reunifying the peninsula, the building of a
national, or self-sufficient, economy was envisioned. As long as the government
enlisted this goal as the standard for its leadership in economic development, soci-
ety accepted that role, and the Park administration was legitimized to some extent.
Our third hypothesis attempts to explain differences in development mechanism
in terms of differences in the social systems of Korea and Taiwan.15 In the case of
Taiwan, the indigenous Taiwanese community is formed by networks characteris-
tic of traditional south China society. These networks are horizontal, open, and
flexible. By horizontal we mean each network member is highly independent and
cannot be easily controlled from above or subordinated. By open we mean that
network boundaries are not well defined and that they can be expanded when
deemed necessary. By flexible we mean that human relationships in these networks
are very functional in the sense that they become active when needed and inactive
when not needed. The networks formed by SMEs, the core of Taiwan’s market-led
development mechanism, have been constructed upon the principles of the net-
works traditionally formed by local Taiwanese. The resources—financial, human,
market, and material—necessary for SMEs to be founded and survive are all made
available through networks. Because of such networks, resources can be efficiently
13 For example, in the case of the planned construction of an integrated steel mill, only 18 per cent of
the capital requested from the private sector was actually received (ROC 1979).
14 The research done by Fields (1995) comes close to our second hypothesis. As mentioned in the
footnote 9, he focused on the differences in Korea and Taiwan concerning enterprise size and
searched for the cause of such differences in the views of their governments.
15 For further details, see the papers in this issue written by Hattori and Numazaki. See also
Sechiyama (1996).
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allocated even if the government does not intervene in the economy, or even if the
formal market system is not very well developed.
On the other hand, although Korean society is also built on the network prin-
ciple, networks there are more vertically organized than in Taiwan, have definite
boundaries beyond which they cannot expand, and are characterized by permanent,
lasting relationships. The Korean development mechanism, in which the govern-
ment controls scarce resources and has under it specific chaebols that directly run
industries, is clearly adapted to the principles of the Korean social network. Or it
may be more correct to say that the principles for forming Korean networks assume
the presence of government.16
The above three hypotheses are not necessarily alternative, but rather comple-
mentary. Under hypothesis 2, it would be difficult for Taiwan to adopt a govern-
ment-led development mechanism; however, the spontaneity with which its mar-
ket-led development mechanism was formed is explained by hypotheses 1 and 3.
Concerning Korea, all three hypotheses explain the reasons for its government-led
development mechanism from several different facets.
CONCLUSIONS
In the present paper, we have attempted to show that while Korea and Taiwan
exhibit similar patterns in the process of their economic development, the mecha-
nisms by which they developed are very different. According to the form outlined
in Figure 1, Figures 2 depicts the development patterns and mechanisms of Korea
and Taiwan.
In conclusion we would like to discuss what implications for other developing
economies can be derived from the difference between these two economies. The
debate over whether Korea and Taiwan economies have been market- or govern-
ment-led has constituted an important part of the general effort to figure out what
level of government intervention was necessary in order to attain economic devel-
opment. However, in the present paper we have attempted to show that since the
development mechanisms of the two economies are clearly different, it is difficult
to build a single development model based on the Korean and Taiwanese experi-
ences. The implication here is that there is no single development mechanism, but
possibly many diverse mechanisms, meaning that it is impossible to offer general
models regarding the role of government and that of the market.
However, such a conclusion merely returns us to our point of departure. A more
constructive implication of our study lies in our hypothesis that the differences in
16 The formation principles of the Korean network originated from the mechanism by which bureau-
crats posts were distributed during the Li dynasty (Hattori 1988, 1992). In the sense that bureau-
crats posts constituted the scarce resource controlled by the government at that time, they are the
equivalent of access to subsidized loans today.
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Fig. 2. Development Patterns and Development Mechanisms in Korea and Taiwan
a. Korea
Poor accumulation at ini-
   tial development stage,
Common goals between
   society and government,
Closed, fixed network
   formation mechanism
Government-led Export-led industri-
   alization relying
   on Japan and
   the United States
Sustained high-
   level economic
   growth
Political and social factors Development mechanism Development pattern
b. Taiwan
Relatively advanced
   accumulation at initial
   development stage,
Deep rift between
   government and society,
Horizontal, open,
   flexible network
   formation mechanism
Market-led Export-led industri-
   alization relying
   on Japan and
   the United States
Sustained high-
   level economic
   growth
Political and social factors Development mechanism Development pattern
Source: Prepared by the authors.
the development mechanisms of Korea and Taiwan are attributable to social and
political differences and differences in the relationship between government and
society. Therefore the development mechanism desirable in each country of the
world depends on how government should work, how society should work, and
what the relationship between the two should be. From our observations we have
been able to identify as some concrete conditions in the selection and introduction
of development mechanisms (1) whether or not government and society possess
common goals, (2) society’s principles of network formation, and (3) society’s past
experience with industrialization. If the first item can be considered a necessary
condition for a government-led development mechanism, and items 2 and 3 neces-
sary conditions for a market-led development mechanism, the selection of a devel-
opment mechanism would therefore depend on which conditions can be best sat-
isfied. If such conditions are lacking, it would, under our assumption, be necessary
to begin with creating policies that would make it possible to satisfy such condi-
tions. In using such an approach, the experience of Korea and Taiwan will certainly
provide us with more, perhaps better, implications about economic development
strategy.
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